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I. PRELIMINARY: THE RECOGNITION OF THE REMEDIAL 
RESTITUTIONARY PROPRIETARY REMEDY 
Some 30 years ago Goff and Jones challenged orthodox legal thinking by 
suggesting, "that equitable proprietary rights may be granted to prevent unjust 
enrichment."' They argued that "[elach case should be considered on its merits 
to decide whether the claimant should have the additional benefits which 
proprietary rights aff~rd."~ In Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (In R ~ c ) ~  the Privy 
Council, adopting the formulation advanced in GofSand Jones, The Law of 
Restitution: accepted that the courts can create a remedial restitutionary 
proprietary right, pursuant to which a plaintiff, is "deemed to have retained 
equitable title" to money in a defendant's posse~sion.~ 
This remedy is all about the conferment of preferential treatment upon a 
plaintiff. As such it raises two issues. The first issue is, in what circumstances 
should the courts be willing to deem that the plaintiff has retained equitable 
title. The second issue is, the nature or extent of this preferential treatment. 
Assume that acting under the influence of a mistake you pay me the sum of 
$1,000.00 twice. Unaware of your mistake, I use the second and mistaken 
payment to purchase a painting of an unknown painter. That painter sub- 
sequently becomes fashionable and the painting is now worth $10,000.00. 
Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd suggests that 
preferential recovery may be available. But what form should this take? 
Should you receive an equitable charge (i.e. a security interest) over the 
painting for the value of your mistaken payment? Or should you be able to 
transform the deemed equitable ownership of the money into equitable 
ownership of the painting - something now worth $10,000.00? 
It is this second issue, "What is the extent to which preferential treatment 
should be conferred?" which this article addresses. It is submitted that 
significant guidance is provided by a number of existing remedies for the 
recovery of money. In Part I1 the preferential treatment which is associated 
with the recovery of trust money is examined. This examination reveals 
that there are both several forms which preferential treatment may take and 
several approaches to tracing. 
* I would like to thank Mr J M Hanan for his comments on a draft of this article. 
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The common law claim for "money had and received" may also confer 
a degree of preferential treatment. This preferential treatment is especially 
dealt with in Part 111. Similarities and fundamental differences in respect 
of the preferential treatment which is available for the recovery of trust 
money and the recovery of one's money8 are here examined. The resulting 
comparison culminates in Part IV and a general consideration of the 
preferential treatment which on the authorities, can now be inferred and it 
is submitted, should be available with a remedial restitutionary proprietary 
remedy. 
11. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND 
THE RECOVERY OF TRUST MONEY 
1. Introduction 
(a) The application of existing tracing rules andpresumptions 
Preferential treatment for the recovery of money is usually associated 
with the recovery of trust money from an insolvent trustee andlor a trustee 
who has breached the terms of the trust. One solution is to regard the 
equitable title which the Privy Council suggests is deemed to have been 
retained, as if it were a pre-existing equitable interest and apply the existing 
equitable tracing rules and presumptions. There are some attractions with 
this solution. Nevertheless the indiscriminate application of these rules and 
presumptions is inappropriate. They were developed to protect a beneficial 
owner against a dishonest and usually insolvent trustee. They may not be 
appropriate outside that contexte9 Indeed, Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd 
contains Lord Mustill's warning, that it is "unprofitable [to consider the 
application of tracing rules] without a clear understanding of when and 
how the equitable interest arose, and of its nature."1° Confirmation that the 
specific circumstances surrounding a claim to trace are important is 
provided by the fact that Equity distinguishes the 'dishonest' recipient of 
trust money from the 'innocent' voluntary recipient thereof." 
(b) Guidance which the equitable tracing rules can provide 
The remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy should be regarded as 
an evolution in the recognition of proprietary interests and the conferment 
of preferential recovery. A moment's reflection reveals how the preserva- 
tion of one's p r o p e y  provides an attractive rationale for conferring 
preferential recovery.' While the passage of time may have given credence 
or legitimacy to earlier judicial decisions as to the recognition of,13 or 
continuation of,14 proprietary interests (and the associated preferential 
treatment), it certainly appears that these decisions were motivated by 
s "One's money" refers to the situation in which the plaintiff is the legal owner of the money and 
he or she is asserting that ownership against another. 
9 Goffand Jones, op cit, note 4 at 83. 
lo  Supra, note 3 at 405 per Lord Mustill. 
1 I Sinclair v Brougham [I9141 AC 398,442-3. 
12 AS Professor Grey has commented, "[tlhe value-laden mystique generated by appeals to 'property' 
exerts a powerful ... moral leverage." Kevin Grey, "Property in Thin Air" [I9911 CLJ 252,305. 
1 3  Two examples are the equitable interest of a purchaser of land: Phillips v Silvester (1872) LR 8 
Ch App 173, Clarke v Ramuz [I8911 2 QB 456; and the vendors lien: Mackreth v Symmons (1 808) 
15 Ves Jr 329; 33 ER 778. 
14 Consider the general rule that if a person entrusts his or her property to an agent to be sold, the 
purchase monies become the property of the principal: Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HL Cas 28. 
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policy reasons. The language of 'property' was more often than not simply 
a mechanism to implement these considerations. Policy decisions are 
displayed in the recent cases ofspace Investments Ltd v Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce Trust Co (Bahamas) Ltd,15 A-G for Hong Kongv Reid,16 
and Napier v Hunter.17 Underlying the existing equitable tracing rules and 
presumptions are policy considerations which are equally applicable to the 
remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy. For this reason, while their 
indiscriminate application may be inappropriate, they may provide signifi- 
cant guidance. 
It is fairly evident that there are three specific factors which have been 
instrumental and which are relevant for the development of the remedial 
restitutionary proprietary remedy. These are: 
(i) the nature of the preferential treatment sought; 
(ii) the ability to identify what has happened to the money; and 
(iii) the relationship between the plaintiff and the immediate recipient of 
the money. 
2. An Overview 
To summarise, the 'law' has gone to considerable lengths to protect 
equitable interests against insolvent trustees and/or trustees who have 
breached the terms of their trust. This has been achieved through the 
development of three general responses, virtually hardened into rules. The 
first rule (and the rule which provides the basis for protection against a 
trustee's insolvency) is that should the trustee become insolvent, equitable 
ownership of trust property does not pass to the Official Assignee (or 
equivalent). 
The next two rules arise when trustees are in breach. The first of these 
rules is premised upon the fiction that the misappropriation of trust money 
and its employment in the acquisition of an asset can be transformed into 
an authorised alteration in the composition of the trust property.'* Equity's 
second response is to recognise that the beneficiary's equitable interest in 
the trust property survives the transfer of the legal title to those who are 
unable to plead bona fide purchaser for value without notice. 
These responses are relatively easy to understand but the way they apply 
and relate to one another is not so easy; indeed, they may be "highly 
technical and often irrational".lg The problem is trying to rationalise cases 
when so many of the results appear to be so different.20 But why has this 
occurred? It would seem that part of the cause arises from the existence of 
different preferential treatments which an aggrieved party may seek. Three 
clear situations stand out: 
1s [I9861 1 WLR 1072 (PC). The availability of an equitable charge over the assets of an insolvent 
bank trustee. 
16 [I9941 1 NZLR 1 (PC). The imposition of a constructive trust so as to facilitate the preferential 
recovery of bribes paid to a fiduciary. 
17 [I9931 1 All ER 385 (HL). The imposition of an equitable lien over the proceeds of a settlement 
so as to facilitate the recovery of money by an insurer. 
18 Re Hallett's Estate, Knatchbull v Hallett (1879) 13 Ch D 696 (CA), 709. 
19 Gofland Jones, op cit, note 4 at 86. 
20 A classic example is provided by Re Hallett's Estate supra, note 18 and Re Oatway Hertslet v 
Oatway [I9031 2 Ch 356. 
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(i) when the defendant is insolvent ("the insolvency preference"); 
(ii) when the defendant has profited ("the profit preference"). An example 
is when a breaching trustee has used 'trust' money to acquire an asset. 
The beneficiary can normally claim equitable ownership of that asset 
with the result that if it's value has appreciated the beneficiary acquires 
the increased value too;21 and 
(iii) when the defendant is not the immediate wrongdoer but a subsequent 
party ("the subsequent recipient preference"). An example is when a 
beneficiary seeks to recover trust money from a party who was given 
it by the trustee. 
A claim for preferential treatment may also be a combination of all or 
some of these preferences. 
When one closely examines these forms of preferential treatment it 
becomes clear that there is a hierarchical approach in respect of the courts 
willingness to confer them. This is important for the remedial restitutionary 
proprietary remedy. 
3. The insolvency preference claim 
From an early stage in the development of the bankruptcy laws, it was 
recognised that trust property administered by an insolvent trustee should not 
be available for distribution amongst creditors. What is interesting is the extent 
to which the courts, when subsequently confronted with the problem of 
insolvent trustees who have misappropriated trust money, have developed 
sophisticated tracing rules and presumptions to identify trust property.22 
The term "direct substitution" tracing will be used to refer to the situation 
in which there is undisputed evidence that the trust money now resides in 
another specific and identified form. This situation is straightforward. 
Assuming only trust money has been used to acquire the asset, the benefi- 
ciary "may either take the property itself [i.e. assert equitable ownership 
of that property] or claim a lien on it for the amount of the [trust] money 
expended in the purchase [i.e. assert an equitable security over it]."23 The 
former remedy is not available, however, if mixed funds have been used.24 
But what if there isn't such evidence, for instance, if the trust money has 
been mixed in a bank account? An immediate difficulty is evidentiary, 
determining the identity of the withdrawals. Is it trust money? Non-trust 
money? Or a combination? The mixed bank account cases provide 
evidence of the court's willingness to confer the insolvency preference 
upon a beneficiary. The ability to identify the trust money has been 
extended beyond the direct substitution approach. In some situations a 
more relaxed factual association between the trust money and a surviving 
asset is sufficient. As Re Oatwa~?~ displays, the fact that trust funds were 
2 I In re Hallett 's Estate, ibid; Sinclair v Brougham supra, note 1 1 .  
22 Recognising that this process was not so much concerned with the recovery of one's property but 
the conferral of preferential treatment at the expense of the trustee's unsecured creditors, Sir 
George Jesse1 MR provided the now orthodox justification for it. He asserted baldly that "[nlo 
human being ever gave credit to a man on the theory that he would misappropriate trust money, 
and thereby increase his assets." In re Hallett's Estate ibid, at 730. 
23 Sinclair v Brougham supra, note 11 at 442 per Lord Parker. 
24 Ibid. 
2s Supra, note 20. 
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in the bank account at the time of a withdrawal is regarded as being 
sufficient to justify the conferral of a charge over any asset acquired with 
those funds. It is presumed that trust money has contributed towards the 
purchase of this asset. 
In that case, although the fund had been extinguished, one of the earlier 
withdrawals had been used to acquire a parcel of shares. Applying a 
"mechanical interpretati~n"~~ of the Hallett resumption of an honest 
trustee who withdraws his or her money first,"the trust fund would have 
been regarded as extinguished. Joyce J responded by taking the view that 
this presumption required that the shares be regarded as representing the 
trust fund.28 It is presumed that trust money survives in any asset acquired 
with the mixed fund. Indeed, it may be argued that the beneficiary can 
assert a charge for the amount of the trust money originally mixed in that 
bank account over both the bank account and any asset acquired with 
proceeds from that account.29 Re Oatway further suggests that this charge 
is for the value of the trust money deposited in the mixed bank account, as 
opposed to the value of the trust money which may have been used in the 
purchase. This approach to tracing is referred to as "presumed substitution" 
tracing. 
The presumed substitution approach is favourable to the beneficiary. In 
some situations, however, it may not be favourable enough. There may be 
evidence that the trustee's assets have increased as a result of the misap- 
plication of trust money, but insufficient evidence associating the trust 
money with the acquisition of any particular asset. In Sinclair v 
B r o ~ g h a r n ~ ~  approximately £10.7 million of depositors' money had been 
mixed with approximately £1 million of shareholders' assets in the opera- 
tion of what was an ultravires banking business. The nature ofthe business, 
the amount of money and the number of transactions was such that neither 
the direct substitution nor the presumed substitution approaches to tracing 
were capable of identifying the depositors' money. As a matter of fact, 
however, the depositors' money must have contributed towards the acqui- 
sition of the approximately £12 million of assets which was then owned 
by the insolvent business. Given this graphic evidence of an accumulation 
in assets which could not be explained by reference to only the sharehold- 
ers' funds, it is not surprising that the House of Lords held that the 
depositors could 'trace' their money into these assets. This approach to 
tracing will be referred to as one of "surviving enrichment". Its focus is 
not on the acquisition of any specific asset with trust money but whether 
in the final analysis trust money must have been used to acquire the assets. 
26 Goffand Jones, op cit, note 4 at 87. 
27 The initial solution to this problem was the "first in first out" rule developed by Sir William Grant 
MR in Devavnes v Noble; Clayton's Case (1 8 16) 1 Mer 572; 35 ER 78 1 at 608-610; 793. In re 
Hallett S ~ s i a t e ,  supra, note 18at 727, ~ e s s d  ~ ~ ' ~ o s t u l a t e d  th  notion of a presumptively honest 
trustee and applied it to trustees who if not actually dishonest, have breached the trust. He observed 
that a trustee who in breach of trust has mixed moneys with his or her own, "cannot be heard to 
say that he [or she] took away the trust money when he [or she] had a right to take away his [or 
her] own money." 
28 In re Oatway supra, note 20 at 360. 
29 Support for this argument is provided by Lord Parker's observation in Sinclair v Brougham, supra, 
note 1 1  at 442, that "[tlhe trustee is precluded by his own misconduct from asserting any interest 
in the property until ... [the trust money extended in its purchase] has been refunded." While this 
observation appears to have been made in the context of one asset acquired with mixed money, it 
is submitted that it accurately reflects the position. 
30 Ibid. 
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The high-water mark of this favouritism is Space Investments Ltd.31 
Pondering the situation where a bank trustee makes an unauthorised loan 
of trust money to itself, mixes that money and subsequently becomes 
insolvent, Lord Templeman considered that the inability to specifically 
identify the trust money would not be fatal. He observed: 
Equity allows the beneficiaries, or a new trustee appointed in place of an insolvent bank 
trustee to protect the interests of the beneficiaries, to trace the trust money to all the assets 
of the bank and to recover the trust money by the exercise of an equitable charge over all 
the assets of the bank. Where an insolvent bank goes into liquidation that equitable charge 
secures for the beneficiaries and the trust priority over the claims of the customers in respect 
of their deposits and over claims of all other unsecured creditors. This priority is conferred 
because the customers and other unsecured creditors voluntarily accept the risk that the 
trustee bank might become insolvent and unable to discharge its obligations in full. On the 
other hand, the settler of the trust and the beneficiaries interested under the trust, never, 
accept any risks involved in the possible insolvency of the trustee bank.32 
It is important to recognise that Lord Templeman was considering the 
situation where it is a matter of pure conjecture whether the trust money 
has been absorbed into the trustee's assets, employed in the acquisition of 
any surviving asset, or simply dissipated. As a matter of policy, however, 
Lord Templeman considers that the beneficiary should be accorded pref- 
erential treatment through the medium of a charge. Such tracing shall be 
referred to as "protective presumed retention". While his Lordship's views 
were applied by Cooke P in Liggett v Ken~ing ton ,~~  when that case came 
before the Privy Council, Lord Mustill reiterated the orthodox view that 
tracing is defeated by evidence that the trust funds have in fact been 
dissipated, for instance by being paid into an overdrawn account.34 The 
views of Lord Mustill were subsequently followed in Bishopsgate Invest- 
ment Management Ltd (In Liq) v H ~ m a n . ~ ~  
4. The profit preference 
While claims for an insolvency preference may be the most common 
form of preferential treatment which a beneficiary may seek, it is not the 
only form. A beneficiary may also seek to recover the profit which the 
trustee has made through the successful 'investment' of the trust moneys 
in an appreciating asset ("the profit preference"). The foundation for this 
preference is the general prohibition against a trustee dealing with the trust 
property for personal benefit. Any trustee engaging in such unauthorised 
activities is required to account to the beneficiary for the resulting profit. 
In some situations this personal remedy may be elevated into a right of 
property and it is with such situations that this section is concerned. 
The classic situation in which a profit preference is available occurs 
when there is direct evidence that the trustee has acquired the appreciating 
asset solely with trust money. In such situations the beneficiary can assert 
equitable ownership of that asset and thereby gain the full benefit of the 
appre~ia t ion.~~ Underlying the elevation of the personal remedy into a right 
3 1  Supra, note 15. 
32 Ibid.at 1074. 
33 [1993] 1 NZLR257 (CA). 
34 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd supra, note 3 at 405. 
35 [1994] 3 WLR 1270 (CA). 
36 Phipps v Boardman [I9761 2 AC 46 (HL) suggests that the trustee may have a claim for 
reimbursement of expenses and an allowance but see Guiness Plc vSawlders [1990] 2 WLR324 (HL). 
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of property is the fiction that the breach of trust can be transformed into an 
authorised act which was done by the trustee in execution of his or her 
duties. As Lord Templeman noted in A-G for Hong Kong v Reid, equity 
considers as done that which ought to be done.37 
If the trustee is insolvent, the profit preference can be amalgamated with 
the insolvency preference so as to confer preferential recovery upon the 
beneficiary, not only for the original value of the trust fund but also for the 
profit. Reid provides a recent example of this. There bribes received by a 
fiduciary were invested in the purchase of farm land. Underlying the 
conferral of this double preferential treatment is the policy that the trustee's 
unsecured creditors should be in no better position than the trustee was 
in.38 
An interesting aspect of the profit preference is that the courts appear to 
have adopted a conservative approach to its availability. This should be 
contrasted to the courts apparent willingness to confer the insolvency 
preference so as to facilitate the recovery of the original value of the trust 
money. Especially is this conservatism apparent where not all the moneys 
used are trust money. Clearly the beneficiary cannot assert full equitable 
ownership of the appreciating asset. Subject to the trustee recovering his 
or her contribution to the purchase price, however, it can be argued that as 
a sanction against the trustee's breach of trust all the profit should go to 
the beneficiary. While for many this may be an attractive argument, it does 
not appear to have been accepted. With the exception of an unusual 
Australian decision,39 there is, at the most, general judicial support for the 
view that the beneficiary and trustee share the resulting profit proportionate 
to their respective  contribution^.^^ There is even some suggestion that the 
beneficiary is only entitled to assert a security interest over the property 
for the value of the trust money employed in its acq~ is i t ion .~~  
Even in those cases in which the courts have acknowledged that the 
beneficiary can recover a proportion of the profit, there appears to be a 
reluctance to find that the trust money has in fact been used. Consider Re 
Tilley 's Will Trusts.42 Mrs Tilley was the executrix and life tenant of her 
husband's estate. In breach of trust she deposited trust money into her 
personal bank account. Over the ensuing years she used the funds from this 
account and a pre-arranged overdraft facility to acquire a number of houses. 
Following her death the reversionary beneficiaries of the late husband's 
estate sought to recover a share of the profit. While Ungoed-Thomas J 
considered that as a general rule the mere use of trust money in the 
acquisition of another asset should entitle the beneficiaries to a proportion- 
ate share of the resulting profit (if any), he held that in the circumstances 
of this case this rule was inapplicable. But why? Ungoed-Thomas J 
advanced a number of reasons, including: the fact that the trust moneys 
"bore a small proportion to the purchase price"; Mrs Tilley's "ample 
overdraft facilities"; the innocent breach of trust; a finding that Mrs Tilley 
37 Supra, note 16 at 4. 
38 Ihid. 
~ - 
39 Australian Postal Corporation v Lutak(1991) 21 NSWLR 584. See also PaulA Davies (Australia) 
Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Davies [1983] 1 NSWLR 440. 
40 Re Tilley 's Will Trusts [I9671 2 WLR 1533 and Scott v Scott (1962) 109 CLR 649 (HC Aust). 
41 Re Hallett's Estate suDra note 18 at 709. 
42 Supra, note 40. 
Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 6,  199.51 
never intended to use this money with which to acquire the property; and 
that "the trust moneys were not invested in properties at all but merely went 
in reduction of Mrs Tilley's overdraft which was in reality the source of 
the purchase-moneys."43 While there is some judicial support for the last 
ju~tif ication,~~ clearly some of these reasons are inconsistent. One is left 
with the suspicion that his Honour was of the view that the recovery of the 
original value of the trust money would sufficiently remedy the breach of 
trust. 
Mixed funds give rise to two difficulties for a beneficiary seeking the 
profit preference. The first difficulty is evidentiary. Was it trust monies 
which were used in the purchase? It was to address such problems in the 
context of the insolvency preference, that the presumed substitution ap- 
proach was developed. While a presumption as to the perpetuation of the 
trust money has been used to justify the conferment of the insolvency 
preference, it can be argued that such a presumption is insufficient to justify 
the availability ofthe profit preference. After all, unless there is clear roof 
of a direct contribution, the division of any profit must be arbitrary. b: 
The second difficulty is one of legal logic. This suggests that any 
equitable interest claimed by the beneficiary in respect ofthe after acquired 
asset can only be one of a security interest. At outset the beneficiary only 
held a security interest over the mixed fund. So logically, this interest could 
not grow into something larger. Certainly not into an actual 'ownership' 
interest. But consider the example of the trustee who deposits $150.00 of 
misappropriated trust money into his account in which there is an existing 
credit balance of $100.00. He subsequently withdraws $100.00 and buys 
an asset with it. The remaining $150.00 is dissipated on good living. Re 
O a t w a ~ ~ ~  suggests that if the trustee is insolvent the beneficiary can assert 
a charge over the asset for the trust money and that charge will be for 
$1 50.00. It fo!lows that if the shares appreciate up to $1 50.00 all the profit 
will be the beneficiary's pursuant to the charge. If this is a true interpreta- 
tion ofRe Oatway it appears then that Equity is willing to confer the benefit 
of the appreciation upon the beneficiary to the extent that this is necessary 
to restore the value of the trust money. 
5. Subsequent recipient preference 
(a) Overview 
The vulnerability ofthe equitable interest to destruction is due to the fact 
that the trustee, as the legal owner of the trust property, is able to transfer 
legal title to others ("subsequent recipients"). The judicial response has 
been to recognise that the equitable interest may survive this transfer. If 
the subsequent recipient has not given any consideration for the trust 
43 Ibid, at 1545-1546. 
44 In Re Registered Securities Ltd [I9911 1 NZLR 545 (CA) Somers J at 554 considered that "as a 
matter of logic" the deposit of trust money into an overdrawn bank account precluded the 
possibility of any further tracing. See also Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd supra, note 3 at 222. 
45 While a "rolling charge" approach may address this criticism, In many situations its application 
may be impractical. The rolling charge solution "involves treating credits to a bank account made 
at different times and from different sources as a blend or cocktail with the result that when a 
withdrawal is made from that account it is treated as a withdrawal in the same proportions as the 
different interests in the account ... bear to each other at the moment before the withdrawal is 
made." Barlow Clowes International (In Liq) v Vaughan [I9921 4 All ER 22 (CA), 35 per Woolf 
LJ. 
46 Supra, note 20. 
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property or if he or she has had 'notice' of the trust, his or her legal 
ownership is subject to the pre-existing equitable interest. An interesting 
aspect of this response is the steps which the courts have taken to determine 
the extent of the subsequent recipient's liability. The immediate difficulty 
confronting the courts is that the recipient may have dissipated the trust 
money. In response to such concerns the courts have developed two 
specific remedies. These are the "knowing receipt" and the "Tracing" 
remedies. 
A degree of overlap exists but these remedies are fundamentally differ- 
ent. The Tracing Remedy is directed at the donee of a gift or the purchaser 
ofmoney who, while not having 'knowledge' that its transfer was in breach 
of trust, had 'notice' of the trust. The focus of the knowing receipt remedy, 
however, is on those subsequent recipients who are guilty of a want of 
probity or honesty. A defendant of the former must simply restore the 
identifiable surviving money. But because of his or her knowledge, the 
defendant of the latter is invariably punished. He or she suffer the "full 
burdens of tru~teeship".~~ 
The existence of this claim for preferential recovery and the develop- 
ment of two, quite different remedies with which to implement it, is of 
further significance for the remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy. It 
suggests that knowledge of a pre-existing relationship is an important 
factor in determining the liability of parties outside of the relationship. 
(b) The Tracing Remedy 
While the knowing receipt remedy is perhaps the best known48 of these 
two remedies, the Tracing remedy, being an application of the general 
response noted above, provides a foundation upon which the former 
remedy builds. For that reason the Tracing remedy is considered first. 
Regarded by some as an application ofthe law ofpr i~ r i t i e s ,~~  this remedy 
is based on the fact that a pre-existing equitable interest may survive the 
transfer of legal title to another. Sinclair v Broughamso confirms its 
application to money and that the trust money in the possession of the 
subsequent recipient can be further protected through the application of 
tracing rules. Because the recipient is innocent of wrongdoing, he or she 
is obliged to return only the identifiable trust money which remains in his 
or her posse~sion.~' 
While the ability to trace the trust money is an integral component of 
the Tracing remedy, it is significant that the rules and presumptions which 
are applied are more sympathetic towards the interests of the subsequent 
recipient than those which are applicable to the express trustee and the 
47 In re Montagu 's Settlement Trusts [I9871 2 WLR 1 192, 1200 per Sir Robert Megarry V-C. 
48 AS Professor Rickett has observed, "[sltranger liability has historically been divided into 'knowing 
receipt' and 'knowing assistance' categories." CEF Rickett, "Strangers as Constructive Trustees 
inNew Zealand" (1991) 11 OJLS 598,601. See also JK Maxton, "Equity" [I9901 NZ Recent Law 
Review 89,91-92. 
49 RP Austin, "Constructive Trusts", from Finn (ed) Essays in Equity (1985) 214-215 and M Cope 
Constructive Trusts (1992) 380-381. 
so Supra, note 11. See also Re Diplock [I9481 1 Ch 465 at 536-537. 
5 1  Sinclair v Brougham ibid at 442-3 per Lord Parker. See also In re Montagu's Settlement Trusts 
supra, note 47 at 1203. It may be argued that "justice between the parties" (O'SuNivan v 
Manaaement A~encv and Music Ltd 119851 Ch 428.468 oer Fox L.n demand that the innocent 
third party shodd have a claim for an gllowkce to reflect his or her skill and labour in preserving 
the trust property andlor increasing its value. 
132 Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 6, 19951 
knowing recipient.52 Nevertheless, the Tracing remedy has the potential to 
confer both recovery in excess of the trust money so received53 and 
preferential recovery should the subsequent recipient be insolvent. 
(c) The knowing receipt remedy 
In its classic form the knowing receipt remedy becomes available when 
the subsequent recipient receives for his or her own benefit, trust money 
which he or she is trust money and which has been transferred 
to him or her in breach of trust.55 Once liability is determined, the sub- 
sequent recipient becomes personally liable to repay the value of the trust 
money so received.56 Equity also imposes "the full burden of t ru~teeship"~~ 
upon the subsequent recipient.58 Not only is the money deemed to be held 
on trust for the beneficiary but the same tracing rules and presumptions 
which apply to express trustees are available to the benefi~iary.~' As with 
the Tracing remedy, the availability of tracing confers the ability to acquire 
both insolvency and profit preferences against the subsequent recipient. 
6. Guidance for the remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy 
The preceding examination has displayed the extensive steps which the 
courts have been prepared to go in conferring preferential treatment for the 
recovery of trust money. While the indiscriminate application of this 
preferential treatment to the remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy 
may be inappropriate, it can provide significant guidance for that remedy. 
Indeed, the preceding examination is immediately useful for disassociating 
the availability of preferential treatment from claims for preferential 
recovery on the defendant's insolvency. While the primary motivation for 
the development of the remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy has 
been to obtain an insolvency preference, subsequent calls for preferential 
treatment may not be so re~tricted.~' The preceding examination also shows 
that the courts are more willing to confer preferential treatment when the 
claim is one for the insolvency preference. For example through the 
52 In contrast to the express trustee or knowing recipient, the 'innocent' subsequent recipient who 
mixes trust money with his or her own money in the acquisition of a depreciating asset, for instance, 
does not bear the loss alone; the loss is shared pari passu. Sinclair v Brougham ibid at 442-3 per 
Lord Parker; In re Diplock supra, note 50. 
53 This would occur when the defendant has used the trust money (and only that money) to acquire 
another asset which has subsequently appreciated in value 
54 There is eonsidcrahle disagreement amongst memhers of the judiciary and academics as to the 
degree of knowledge which is required. 
55 The knowing receipt remedy is also available in those circumstances in which an innocent third 
party "acquires [knowledge] subsequent to such receipt and then deals with the property in a 
manner inconsistent with the trust." In this situation the knowing receipt remedy applies in respect 
to the trust money in the third party's possession at the time he or she receives the knowledge. 
Karak Rubber Co Ltd v Burden (No 2) [I9721 1 WLR 602 at 632-633 per Brightman J. See also 
In re Montagu 's Settlement Trusfs supra, note 47 at 1 198. 
56 In re Montagu's Settlement Trusts ibid, at 1203. 
57 Ibid at 1200 per Sir Robert Megany V-C. 
ss The third party's "in personam liability for a breach of trust is the same as an express trustee, that 
is the [third party], like a trustee, is liable to place the trust in the same position as it would have 
been if no breach had been committed and matters such as causation, forseeability and remoteness 
are usually irrelevant in the calculation of the loss." Cope, op cit, note 49 at 360-361. See also C 
Harpum, "The Stranger as Constructive Trustee" (1 986) 102 LQR 114,119. Indeed, as Mr Harpum 
notes at 267, some would argue that all that occurs in this situation is that the knowing recipient 
becomes a trustee of the original trust. 
59 Sinclair v Brougham supra, note 1 l at 442-443. 
60 The learned author of GoffandJones suggests that in appropriate circumstances a plaintiff should 
be able to recover any profit made by the defendant, op cit, note 4 at 95-98. 
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application of a more extensive approach to identifying trust money. To 
summarise. The ability to identify what has happened can vary from: 
(i) direct evidence (the "direct substitution" approach); to 
(ii) presumptions (the "presumed substitution" and "protective presumed 
retention" approaches); to 
(iii) evidence ofa  surviving accretion to the defendant's overall wealth (the 
"surviving enrichment" approach). 
The availability of the other preferential claims, however, appear to 
depend upon factual evidence of the application or receipt of the trust 
money. Before the profit preference is available, direct evidence of the use 
of the trust money in the acquisition of the asset appears to be required; 
presumed contributions as provided by the presumed substitution and 
presumed protective retention approaches being insufficient. While the 
approach to tracing to a subsequent recipient does not appear to have been 
the subject to judicial deliberation, a restrictive approach also appears to 
be warranted. Since the knowing receipt and Tracing remedies may impose 
a potential liability upon a subsequent recipient who may be quite innocent 
of any wrongdoing, as a matter of policy, there should be positive evidence 
of the transfer. The use of presumptions alone would be inappropriate. 
Support for such a restrictive approach is inherent in both the 'notice' and 
knowledge requirements of the Tracing and knowing receipt remedies. 
Underlying this 'hierarchy' of the courts willingness to confer the 
particular forms of preferential treatment, there appears to be a recognition 
that the policy arguments in favour of conferring preferential treatment, 
(which is always at the expense of another), are strongest when the 
preference is directed at restoring the value of the trust money. 
As was recently emphasised by A-G for Hong Kong v Reid:' the 
underlying relationship is also important. Preferential treatment has been 
created and developed especially to reinforce and protect that relationship. 
Indeed, in Reid the fiduciary relationship between the parties was sufficient 
to justify the conferral of an insolvency preference with respect to the 
recovery of bribes; property which never belonged to the plaintiff Govern- 
ment. The importance of the underlying relationship may explain the focus 
given to the insolvency preference. Repeatedly the courts have emphasised 
that it is the trustee's fundamental obligation not to misappropriate trust 
money, or mix it with another's money. It also explains the availability of 
the profit and subsequent recipient preferences. 
Finally, the creation of two, quite different remedies with which to 
implement the subsequent recipient preference, is significant. Not only 
does it indicate potential concerns in respect of the imposition of liability 
upon another party, but it reinforces the significance of the underlying trust 
relationship. When a recipient knows that the money was derived from a 
breach of trust, he or she is treated as if he or she was the original trustee. 
This may provide guidance to the remedial restitutionary proprietary 
remedy in determining whether a defendant, who knew of the circum- 
stances surrounding the payment and which establish the right of recovery 
should be treated differently from a defendant who had no such knowledge. 
61 Supra, note 16. 
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111. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND 
THE CLAIM FOR MONEY HAD AND R E C E I V E D ~ ~  
1. Overview 
Another existing remedy which may provide guidance in the develop- 
ment of the remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy is the claim for 
"money had and received". What is particularly significant about this claim 
is that, while its approach to the conferral of preferential treatment is 
fundamentally different from the recovery of trust money, it displays some 
important similarities. 
The suggestion that a common law personal remedy, by which money 
is "recoverable as [if it were] a debt",63 may assist in determining the extent 
of the preferential treatment, may be puzzling to some. Such a reaction 
comes about because the traditional distinction between "personal" reme- 
dies and "proprietary" remedies is overdone.64 A claim for money had and 
received culminates in an order for the payment of a sum of money. 
Nevertheless, in the context of the recovery of one's money,65 this claim 
is in fact protecting the plaintiffs legal ownership of that money.66 It is in 
this context that this claim may confer preferential recovery.67 
The recovery of one's money raises similar issues of preferential treat- 
ment as are raised with the recovery of trust money and the remedial 
restitutionary proprietary remedy. Assume that I steal a $100.00 bank note 
from you and I am insolvent. If you can specifically identify your bank 
note in my possession (for instance by reference to its serial number) 
should you be treated as if you are one of my unsecured creditors and as 
such be entitled only to participate in the distribution ofmy assets or should 
you be able to recover that note or its equivalent value? What if I placed a 
winning bet with the stolen money, should your recovery be limited to the 
value of the stolen money or should you also be able to recover the profit 
as well? What if I had given this bank note to another person, should you 
be able to recover it or its value from that party? It is because of the 
similarity of these that a consideration of the claim for money had and 
received can provide guidance. 
62 For a general overview of this claim and its potential to facilitate the preferential recovery of money 
see SR Scott, "The Recovery of Money - Recognising the Potential of the Claim for Money Had 
and Received (1994) 8 OLR 239. 
63 Sinclair v Brougham supra, note 11 at 414 per Viscount Haldane LC. 
64 AS Professor Maitland has noted, the personallproprietary classification does not "fit the native 
stuff." Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law (1962) 74. 
65 See above at note 8. 
66  Money is fascinating; while an integral part of our everyday lives it is easy to forget some of its 
characteristics. For the purpose of this article, the most important characteristic of money is that 
it can be regarded as property. When money takes its traditional form of bank notes and coins, this 
proprietary attribute is readily apparent. It is true that an owner of a bank note or coin usualIy 
values it for its purchasing power as opposed to its intrinsic value. It is also true that one's ownership 
of a bank note or coin is relatively vulnerable; money is one of the principal exceptions to the 
general rule of nemo dat; legal title pass to those who acquire possession thereof, "fairly and 
honestly upon a valuable and bona fide consideration". Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 542; 97 ER 
398 at 457-8; 401 per Lord Mansfield. Implicit in this last characteristic, however, is the 
acknowledement that banknotes and coins can be regarded as items of property which are capable - . .  . 
of ownershTp. 
67  The claim may culminate in "a result [which is] akin to priority" S Khurshid and P Matthews, 
"Tracing Conhsion" (1979) 95 LQR 78, 78. Alternatively, a remedy which "may not be less 
effective than equity's lien ... " Goffand Jones, op cit, note 4 at 78 note 34. 
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2. The genesis of preferential treatment - the claim against subsequent 
recipients 
The common law has adopted a fundamentally different approach to 
conferring preferential recovery than that adopted by Equity. Preferential 
recovery of one's money is achieved at common law through the imposi- 
tion of strict personal liability upon the recipient of another's money to 
repay the value of that money.68 While the resulting personal obligation 
survives the loss of the original money, it is, of course, vulnerable to the 
defendant's insolvency. It is in this situation that the proprietary attributes 
of money become important. Not only may the plaintiffs ownership of the 
money survive its physical transfer to the immediate recipient (i.e. the thief 
or the finder) but it may also survive its physical transfer to a subsequent 
recipient. I steal your $100.00 bank note and give that bank note to a friend. 
Clearly I never acquired legal ownership. And irrespective of my friend's 
bona fides, since he or she gave no consideration for the money, the 
currency exception to the nemo dat rule does not apply so as to divest you 
of your o ~ n e r s h i p . ~ ~  You can bring a claim for money had and received 
against the subsequent recipient. 
Clarke v Shee and Johnston70 is an example. The plaintiffs clerk had 
received money for which he was liable to account to the plaintiff. He used 
some of the money, however, to purchase lottery tickets from the defen- 
d a n t ~ . ~ '  As Lord Mansfield observed, "the money and notes which [the 
clerk] paid to the defendants [were] the identical notes and money of the 
plaintiff,"72 Having identified his money as having been received by the 
defendants, the plaintiff was able to successfully bring a claim for money 
had and received against them. 
It is this combination of: (a) the ability to bring this remedy against all 
recipients of one's money; and (b) the fact that liability arises from the receipt 
and not the retention of that money, which provides the means by which this 
'personal' remedy is able to confer a measure of preferential treatment.73 
There are two particularly interesting aspects about this remedy. First 
the cases in which preferential treatment has been conferred have been 
"very rare".74 Secondly it appears that the cases in which the courts have 
been prepared to confer preferential treatment have been restricted to 
situations in which the immediate recipient of the money has become 
insolvent. 
68 For a recent judicial reiteration of this characteristic see Agip (Afiica) Ltd v Jackson [I9921 4 All 
ER 451 (CA), 463. 
69 Ownership of bank notes and coins pass to those who acquire possession thereof "fairly and 
honestly upon avaluable and bona fide consideration". Miller v Race supra, note 66 at 457-8; 401 
per Lord Mansfield. 
70 (1774) 1 Cowp 197; 98 ER 1041. 
71 While the defendant gave 'value' for this money by issuing the lottery tickets, this value did not 
constitute good consideration; the transaction being contrary to the Lottery Act 1772. 
72 Supra, note 70 at 200; 1043. 
73 AS Professor Goode explains:"Each movement of the asset from one recipient to another ... brings 
into existence a distinct personal right of [the owner] against that recipient and a distinct new duty 
of account by the recipient to [the owner]; and since the recipient, having once incurred a personal 
duty by his receipt of the asset, cannot thereafter shuffle it off by a dealing inconsistent with [the 
owner's] rights but on the contrary will infringe such rights by that dealing, it follows that [the 
owner's] ... rights against the successive recipients are not alternative but cumulative." 
Goode, "The Right to Trace and its Impact in Commercial Transactions" (1976) 92 LQR 360, 
z a z 7 n  --, - . -. 
74 Goffand Jones op cit, note 4 at 3. 
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3. The subsequent recipient preference 
While examples may be rare, Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltds  confirms 
its availability. That case involved a claim by the plaintiff firm of solicitors 
to recover money which had been misappropriated from its client account 
by one of its partners (one Cass) and unsuccessfully gambled by him at the 
defendant club. By being able to trace 'their' money from the bank's chose 
in action, through the hands of Cass, to the defendant club, the plaintiffs 
were able to pursue this claim against the defendant club. 
Two reasons explain the rarity of these claims. The first is that the 
subsequent recipient will often acquire legal title. Deprived of his or her 
legal title, the plaintiff (and now former owner) is unable to sue the 
subsequent recipient; and is restricted to pursuing a claim against the initial 
recipient of the money. The second and probably more important reason 
is the associated evidentiary problems. The difficulty is to identify what 
the immediate recipient does with the money. When the money is kept 
distinct from other money this process is relatively easy. Problems arise if 
the money is mixed. It appears that in the eighteenth century the courts of 
common law when confronted with the problem of tracing money adopted 
the tracing rules which Chancery had then d e ~ e l o p e d . ~ ~  When compared 
to the existing "modern [Equitable] doctrine"77 of tracing these rules 
appear conservative and constrained by "quaint and artificial restric- 
t i o n ~ " . ~ ~  The common law courts have traditionally approached tracing "in 
a strictly materialistic way"79 analogous to the direct substitution approach 
developed by Chancery. Applying what has been referred to as an 'ex- 
change-product' theory of tracing, the common law courts have required 
that there be evidence of a direct substitution of the plaintiffs money for 
an asset before they would regard the new asset as belonging to the 
plaintiff. 
One of the most important cases for common law tracing is Taylor v 
Pl~mer.~O While Lord Ellenborough CJ recognised that money could be 
followed at common law, he expressed the then orthodox equitable limi- 
tation that this right ceases once the money is mixed with other money.81 
Nowadays when the greatest store of 'money' may well be the bank 
account, such a limitation automatically imposes a considerable constraint 
upon the ability to trace one's money.82 It is submitted that underlying such 
[I9911 1 WLR 10. See also Banque Beige Pour L 'Etranger v Hambrouck [I9211 1 KB 321 (CA). 
This process is apparent in Scott v Surman (1742) Willes 400; 125 ER 1235 and Taylor v Plumer 
(1815) 3 M & S 562; 105 ER 721. See Scott, op cit, note 62 at 256-8. 
Re Hallett's Estate supra, note 18 at 708 per Jesse1 MR. 
Nimmo v Westpac Banking Corporation [I9931 3 NZLR 218 (HC), 238 per Blanchard J. 
Re Diplock supra, note 50 at 5 18 per Lord Greene MR. 
Supra, note 76. For a recent examination of this case, see Lionel D Smith "Tracing in Taylor v 
Plumer: Equi in the Court of Kings Bench" [I9951 LMCLQ 240. 
Supra, note 77at 555; 726. 
Jackson v Anderson (181 1) 4 Taunt 23; 128 ER 235 suggests that if a plaintiffs money is mixed 
in a bank account and another person receives all the 'money' in that account, the plaintiff can 
trace his or her 'money' to that recipient. The plaintiffs agent had consigned to his principal 1969 
Spanish Dollars (which belonged to the plaintiff). It appears that these coins had been mixed with 
a quantity of other Spanish Dollars belonging to the defendant who innocently exchanged all the 
coins for English pounds. Mansfield CJ held that the intermixture had no effect on the defendant's 
liability in trover - having disposed of all the dollars, the defendant had disposed of those 
belonging to the plaintiff. 
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conservatism has been a fear of imposing absolute liability upon volun- 
ta19~ innocent subsequent recipients of another's money.g4 
To fulfil its function as a means of exchange, money must be able to 
circulate freely. To do this recipients must be confident, not only that they 
will acquire ownership, but that they will not face liability for their receipt 
of another's money. Plainly, to remove these fears, currency was made an 
exception to the nemo dat rule.g5 Similar fears apply to the voluntary 
innocent subsequent recipient. The response of Equity via the Tracing 
remedy, suggests that the imposition of liability for the value of the money 
remaining, may be appropriate. Imposition of liability for the value of the 
money received, however, can be seen as being both too drastic and if, say, 
the rule in Clayton 's Caseg6 is used to determine when the plaintiffs money 
is withdrawn from the bank account, ~bi t rary.~ '  The conservatism of the 
common law to tracing mixed money, can be seen as a means to protect 
the voluntary innocent subsequent recipient in a period in which there was 
no "change of position" defence.g8 
On reflection, it will be realised that the approach of the common law 
to tracing money is not too dissimilar to the equitable Tracing and knowing 
receipt remedies. The most extensive tracing rules and presumptions 
associated with "the modem [Equitable] doctrine" of tracing are applied 
when the insolvency preference is being sought, not when a claim is being 
made against a subsequent recipient. Indeed, these rules and presumptions 
are inappropriate when recovery against a subsequent recipient is being 
sought. Is it surprising, therefore, that the common law courts have 
continued with a conservative approach to tracing money when confronted 
with a claim against a subsequent recipient? In defence of the common 
law's conservation, it may be that its critics have not been comparing 'like' 
situation with 'like'? 
In Lipkin G o r n ~ a n , ~ ~  however, the House of Lords has recognised both 
the existence of a change of position defence and its significance on the 
83 In the sense that they had not given any consideration for the money. 
84 Scott, op cit, note 62 at 258-60. 
8s See Miller v Race supra, note 66 at 457; 401. 
86 Devaynes v Noble; Clayton's Case supra, note 27. 
87 Support for this argument is contained within the judgment of Millet J in Agip (Ajkica) Ltd v 
Jackson [I9921 4 All ER 385 (Ch). At 400 (and in an attempt to limit the significance ofthe decision 
of the Court of Appeal in Banque Belge Pour L 'Elranger v Hambrouck; supra, note 75 - a case 
which provides some support for the ability of the common law to trace through a bank account), 
- - 
his Honour suggested: 
"[That case] is no authority for the proposition that [money had and received] lies against a 
subsequent transferee who has parted with the money, and I doubt that it does. At this remove the 
action begins to take on the aspect of a proprietary claim rather than the enforcement of a personal 
right to account. Should it be sought to impose personal liability on a person who has parted with 
the money, recourse can be made to equity, which has developed appropriate principles by which 
such liability can be determined. The alternative is to expose an innocent transferee who has 
dissipated the money to a claim at law where none would exist in equity and to make that liability 
depend on the fortuitous circumstances that the money had not been mixed with other money prior 
to its receipt by him." [I9921 4 All ER 385 at 400 per Millet I. 
Concern for imposing strict common law liability upon third parties may also underlie the 
suggestion by Millet J that the common law can not trace a telegraphic transfer. Professor Birks 
suggests that this limitation "is barely intelligible except as part of a concerted attack on the strict 
common law liability." "Misdirected Funds: restitution from the recipient" [I9891 3 LMCLQ 296, 
340. 
88 The concern for innocent recipients is also apparent in Lord Goff s observations in Lipkin Gorman 
supra, note 75 at 28 on tracing to the effect that "it cannot be relied upon so as to render an innocent 
reci ient a wrongdoer." 
8s 1bi2 
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development of the law. Indeed, their Lordships willingness to recognise 
a more expansive approach to tracing at common law, than the orthodox 
legal approach would suggest is possible, may be attributable to this 
defence. It will be recalled, that a dishonest partner had withdrawn cash 
from Lipkin Gorman's client account for the purpose of continuing his 
gambling. Applying two earlier decisions of the Privy C o u n ~ i l , ~ ~  Lord Goff 
held that the dishonest partner became the legal owner of the cash on its 
withdrawal from the bank. Nevertheless, Lipkin Gorman was successful. 
But if the cash legally belonged to the dishonest partner, how could it also 
legally 'belong' to Lipkin Gorman? While recognising that Lipkin Gorman 
had to establish a basis on which it was entitled to this money, Lord Goff 
was of the opinion that to do so, it did not have to show that the money was 
its legal property; it was only "a general rule" that the necessary basis could 
be so e~tablished.~~ The necessary proprietary base in this case was held 
to be the original chose in action between the solicitors and their bank.92 
In essence, Lipkin Gorman could trace their interest in the chose in action 
into some sort of interest in the money which legally belonged to the 
dishonest partner and which he 'gave' to the defendant club.93 
Counsel in Lipkin Gorrnan had reached agreement as to the amount of 
the plaintiffs money received by the defendant. It is interesting to surmise 
what would have been the result if no such agreement had been made and 
one assumes that Cass had mixed this money (approximately £323,000) 
with his own (approximately £20,000). Factually the level of Cass's 
gambling was such that there can be no doubt that the Club received the 
plaintiffs money. If Lipkin Gorrnan has started a more expansive approach 
to tracing, albeit one focusing upon factual evidence of the receipt of 
another's money, then the ability of the claim for money had and received 
to confer preferential recovery upon the plaintiff may increase. 
4. The insolvency preference 
The ability to acquire an insolvency preference through the claim for 
money had and received is premised upon the plaintiff having a solvent 
defendant. In Lipkin Gorrnan, for instance, the immediate recipient (Cass) 
was insolvent. By being able to trace their money to a solvent subsequent 
recipient (the defendant club) and by bringing a personal claim against that 
recipient, the plaintiffs were able to circumvent Cass's insolvency and 
(subject to the change of position defence) recover their money. 
What about the situation in which the plaintiff can still identify his or 
her money in the possession of the insolvent immediate recipient? Is an 
insolvency preference available? The 'personal' form which this remedy 
takes suggests that the plaintiff is relegated to being an unsecured creditor. 
In this situation, however, the plaintiffs money must be received by 
whoever is administering the insolvent's affairs, i.e. the Official Assignee 
90 Union BankofAustralia Ltdv McClintock [1922] 1 AC 240 and Commercial Banking Co of Sydney 
Ltdv Mann [I9611 AC 1 .  
91 Supra, note 75 at 27. 
92  bid at 29. 
93 Another recent case displaying a similar judicial approach in focusing upon the "reality" of the 
situation is Agip (Afiica) Ltd v Jackson supra, note 68 at 462. See also Reidv Rigby & Co [I8941 
2 QB 40. 
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(or equivalent). Can that person be regarded as a subsequent recipient 
against whom this is available? There is academic support for this.94 
Moreover, judicial support is provided by Scott v S ~ r m a n . ~ ~  Jonathan 
Scott and Francis Richardson consigned a quantity of tar to their agent - 
Richard Scott (Jonathan's brother). Richard sold the tar, receiving in return 
two promissory notes and the discharge of his own debt to the purchaser. 
Richard then became bankrupt and the defendant assignees received both 
the money due on the promissory notes and a bounty paid by the govern- 
ment for the tar's importation. The plaintiffs successfully brou ht a claim % against the defendants in respect ofthis money and the b ~ u n t y . ~  As Willes 
CJ observed: 
The general rule is that if a man receive money which ought to be paid to another or to 
apply to a particular purpose to which he does not apply it, this action will lie as for the 
money had and received. ... To apply this general rule to the present case. The assignees 
having received this money which belongs to the plaintiffs and ought not to be applied to 
pay the bankrupt's debts, and they ought to have paid it to the plaintiffs, and not having 
done so, this action will lie against them for so much money had and received to the use of 
the plaintiffs.97 
Assuming that a personal claim can be brought against the Official 
Assignee, there is still the evidentiary difficulty of showing that the 
plaintiffs money remains identifiable. Because the Official Assignee 
receives all the insolvent's assets, the courts may be willing to adopt a more 
robust approach to tracing. Clearly direct evidence (and, if the earlier 
observations in respect to Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd are accepted, 
factual evidence) should suffice. Evidence of increased assets, similar to 
the "surviving enrichment approach" considered earlier may also suffice. 
5. The profit preference 
So far the availability of preferential treatment has turned upon the 
plaintiff showing that a subsequent recipient has received his or her money. 
What about the situation in which the immediate recipient uses the money 
to acquire an asset with. Can the plaintiff claim an ownership interest in 
that substitute asset? And if so, if that asset has appreciated in value, can 
he or she get the benefit of that appreciation? Theoretically such a claim 
would appear possible. 
Taylor v P l ~ m e r ~ ~  provides a measure of support. The defendant had 
authorised his stock-broker (one Walsh) to uplift funds from his bank and 
invest those funds in the purchase of Exchequer Bills. Contrary to these 
instructions Walsh used some of these funds to acquire American shares 
and stock. Next he exchanged part of these funds for notes of smaller 
denomination and using some of these replacement notes, purchased a 
quantity of bullion. But before Walsh could leave the country he was 
caught by the defendant's attorney and made to surrender the shares, stock 
94 Khurshid and Matthews, op cit, note 67 at 78; RA Pearce, "A Tracing Paper" (1976) 40 Conv 277, 
284; M Scott, "The Rightto 'Trace' at Common Law" [1965-661 WALR463. For a contrary view, 
however, see D Cuthbertson "Tracing at Common Law - Myth or Reality?' (1968) 8 UWALR 
402. 
supra, note 76. See also Whitecomb v Jacob (1711) 1 Salk 160; 91 ER 149. 
Because this money could be identified as directly attributable to the promissory notes and the 
bounty, which in turn were directly attributable to the importation and sale of the tar, the plaintiffs 
could substitute their proprietary interest in the tar for the money received by the defendants. 
97 Scott v Surman supra, note 76 at 403-405; 1237-8. 
98 Supra, note 76. 
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and bullion. The plaintiffs, as Walsh's assignees in bankruptcy, unsuccess- 
fully commenced proceedings in trover against the defendant. The Court 
held that as the defendant could trace his money into these chattels, he had 
a better right to them than the plaintiffs. As Lord Ellenborough CJ ob- 
served: 
It makes no difference in reason or law into what other form, different from the original, 
the change may have been made, whether it be into that of promissory notes for the security 
of the money which was produced by the sale of the goods of the principal, ... or into other 
merchandise, ... for the product of or substitute for the original thing still follows the nature 
of the thing itself, so long as it can be ascertained to be such, and the right only ceases when 
the means of ascertainment fail ... .99 
If the plaintiff can assert an interest in the substitute asset, on general 
principles a claim for its appreciated value, as opposed to its acquisition 
value, may be possible. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical ability for such a claim some suggest 
that it should be restricted to special circumstances. For instance Professor 
Lawson. Here he is discussing Taylor v Plumer: 
[That case is] clearly a pretty odd piece of law ... . [I]t is obviously a fiction to say that what 
my agent has in breach of faith bought with my money is mine. According to all ordinary 
common law ideas it should be his and I should only have a personal action against him, 
that is to say, I should only be able to prove in his bankruptcy for its value. Nowhere else 
does the common law treat a fund as a single entity, which can be recovered as such.100 
There is another general objection. Such claims abrogate the plaintiffs 
original right to recover the value of the money received. So are inconsis- 
tent. Although the application of defences, such as the change of position 
defence, may reduce the amount recovered, the value received should 
constitute the upper limit of recovery. Immediate support for this objection 
is provided by the fact that unlike a trustee, a recipient of another's money, 
for instance a thief or a finder, is under no duties of investment with respect 
to that money. It was submitted earlier that it is the existence of such duties 
of investment which forms the basis of the profit preference available 
against a trustee. 
It may be that Taylor v Plumer is only authority for the ability to trace 
money into a substitute asset when the defendant is insolvent (or to advance 
an even more conservative interpretation, when he or she is an insolvent 
agent)lO' and the aim is to facilitate the recovery of the value of the 
plaintiffs money (i.e. on insolvency preference) as opposed to the confer- 
ment of a true profit preference. 
Irrespective of the width of Taylor v Plumer, the ability to trace one's 
money into an asset should only be available where there is clear evidence 
of a direct substitution of the plaintiffs money for the asset. This restrictive 
approach should apply for the simple reason that the availability of acharge 
has not been recognised by the courts of the common law. 
99 Ibid, at 575; 726. 
loo FH Lawson Remedies of English Law 2nd ed (1980) 149. See also Sutton, "Tracing" [I9821 NZLJ 
67, 72 and Smith, op cit, note 80. Notwithstanding such objections, it may be that such extended 
ideas of ownership are not foreign to the common law. See Scott, op cit, note 62. 
101 Professor Lawson, for instance, suggests that in Taylor v Plumer the court was responding to the 
development of bankruptcy laws, "so as to prevent the agent's misconduct from swelling the funds 
at the disposal of the trustee in bankruptcy." Lawson, Loc cit. 
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6. Guidance for the remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy 
The claim for money had and received provides an interesting compari- 
son with the preferential treatment which is available in the context of the 
recovery of trust money. In both situations the courts are protecting a 
pre-existing 'proprietary' interest. In both situations there is a focus on the 
insolvency preference. But the approach to preferential treatment is fun- 
damentally different. 
One reason for this difference may be the trust relationship. Because of 
the early association of the claim for money had and received and prefer- 
ential treatment with insolvent agents (and the associated agencylfiduciary 
relationship), it is tempting to discount the importance of the trust relation- 
ship for preferential recovery. This association cannot be ignored. But, 
since the underlying rationale of the claim against a subsequent recipient 
is to protect one's ownership of money, no pre-existing relationship is 
necessary. Preferential treatment should be available even if the immediate 
recipient is a thief or a finder. Indeed, in Lipkin Gorman despite the 
immediate recipient being a partner of the plaintiff firm, the House of Lords 
did not regard this as being important in determining the claim. 
Turning to the remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy, in most 
situations there will be no pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff 
and immediate recipient. Obviously there is a similarity between the 
remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy and the claim for money had 
and received. But the narrow approach to preference associated with the 
latter raises doubts about the more generous way the equitable tracing rules 
and presumptions have been applied. Just as the indiscriminate application 
of the equitable tracing rules and presumptions has been warned against, 
a similar warning should also be made with respect to the indiscriminate 
application of the tracing rules and presumptions associated with the claim 
for money had and received. It is to be remembered the restitutionary 
remedy is implemented through the grant of an equitable interest. Indis- 
criminate expansion of the tracing rules may be inappropriate, but the 
greater flexibility of equitable interests would seem desirable. In particular 
the device ofthe 'charge', so that the all or nothing approach of the common 
law is avoided. 
IV. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND THE REMEDIAL RESTITUTIONARY 
PROPRIETARY EMEDY 
So what specific preferential treatment should the remedial restitution- 
ary proprietary remedy be able to confer and in what situations? To 
consider the example given at the commencement of this article - a 
mistaken payment being used to acquire a painting - should the insol- 
vency preference be available and if so should this be in conjunction with 
the profit preference? Alternatively, if instead of buying the picture I had 
given the money to a friend, should the subsequent recipient preference be 
available? 
The learned authors of Goff and Jones suggest that where the plaintiff 
can specifically identify the money in the possession of the immediate 
recipient, the plaintiff should be entitled to receive an insolvency prefer- 
ence, albeit one limited to the value of the mistaken payment. If the 
immediate recipient is both solvent and knew of the facts which form the 
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basis of the plaintiffs restitutionary claim, however, they consider that the 
profit preference should be available.lo2 
As we have seen with respect to the recovery of trust money, claims for 
the insolvency preference receive the most sympathetic reaction; indeed, 
the aim of providing such a preference may explain why the courts of 
common law recognised that money could be traced. The development out 
of this area has been integral to the development of the whole approach for 
the remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy. One can readily agree with 
Goff and Jones as to the availability of the insolvency preference. But the 
possibility of the profit preference appears to turn more on the defendant's 
knowledge. 
Plainly there are two significant inter-relating underlying factors. These 
factors are the underlying rationale for restitutionary relief and the rela- 
tionship between the parties. 
1. Underlying considerations 
(a) A restitutionary remedy 
Except when restitutionary remedies are being used to protect pre-ex- 
isting property rights (for instance the recovery of your $100 bank note 
which I have stolen) or against "wrongdoers" (i.e. dishonest fiduciaries or 
the recipients of confidential information who do not honour that confi- 
dence - the so-called restitution 'for wrongs'), the essence of the restitu- 
tionary claim is that the defendant has been enriched at the expense of the 
plaintiff. The defendant is obliged to restore (subject to defences) the 
enrichment. So inherent in the restitutionary claim is the premise, that the 
value of the enrichment originally received should constitute the upper 
limit of relief. To quote Mr Burrows on orthodox theory, "unjust enrich- 
ment by subtraction is concerned with the highest common amount of 
causally related loss and gain: that is, the gain of the defendant to be 
reversed must be caused by an equivalent loss to the plaintiff."lo3 
Assume for instance that as a result of a causal mistake104 I pay you 
$100.00 or that there has been a total failure of consideration for my 
payment of $100.00 to you. I have a claim for $100.00; this being the value 
of the enrichment conferred upon you at my expense. With the exception 
of the potential availability of the change of position defence, what you 
102 Goffand Jones, op cit, note 4 at 95-98. Irrespective of the defendant's knowledge Professor Jones 
considers that to grant the profit preference against an insolvent defendant "would give [the 
plaintiffj a windfall at the expense of the defendant's general creditors." For this reason he would 
restrict the availability of the rofit reference to the situation in which the defendant is solvent. 
103 Burrows, op cit, note 7 at 19.1s propessor Birks has recognised the "normal measure of restitution 
is 'value received'." Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Paperbacked 1989), 385. At 401 while 
he subsequently argues that there should be a personal claim for the value surviving of the 
enrichment and acknowledges that logically this measure of relief should potentially be able to 
facilitate the recovery of a profit (i.e. when the enrichment can be identified in an appreciating 
asset), he suggests that, "except [as] against a defendant guilty of misconduct, a court might take 
the view that, as between the two bases on which enrichment can be said to survive, a personal 
claimant could use only 'fixed input' and not 'proportionate share'. The phenomenon of inflated 
recovery in the second measure would then cease to arise for that type of claim." 
104 On orthodox theory a causal mistake, as opposed to a fundamental mistake, is insufficient to stop 
title to the money passing to you. The proprietary attributes ofmoney had and received is therefore 
unavailable to confer any preferential treatment, Burrows, ibid, at 4. See Scott, op cit, note 62 at 
263 for a criticism of this particular conservatism. 
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subsequently do with that money is immaterial to your liability. Irrespec- 
tive of whether you have profitably invested that money (say in the 
acquisition of shares which have since doubled in value) my 'personal' 
restitutionary claim against you will be to recover $100.00; the value of 
the money received by you and no more. 
(b) The underlying relationship 
The general requirement of "a correlation between a loss of the plaintiff 
and a gain of the defendant"lo5 is not only justified by the general principle 
of unjust enrichment but also by the fact that this is a fresh relationship. 
There is no pre-existing definitive relationship which imposes any duties 
with respect to this enrichment. 
This enables a comparison to be drawn with the pre-existing trust 
relationship which both governs the response of Equity to the recovery of 
trust money and explains the extent to which certain forms of preferential 
treatment (i.e. the insolvency and subsequent recipient preferences) are 
available, and the availability per se of the profit preference. With the 
recovery of both trust money and one's own money (at common law) a 
pre-existing proprietary interest is being protected. But it is only in respect 
of the recovery of trust money that there is a pre-existing relationship 
imposing positive duties. Further support for the importance of a pre-ex- 
isting relationship is provided by the reasoning of the Judicial Committee 
in A-G for Hong Kong v Reid;lo6 that the fiduciary's duty is not to "obtain 
and retain a benefit in breach of duty".lo7 In that case the receipt by a 
fiduciary of a bribe, justified preferential treatment.Io8 
(c) Consequences 
(i) Non-availability of the proJit preference 
It is submitted that the underlying restitutionary rationale for relief and 
the absence of pre-existing duties owed by the defendant to the plaintiff 
are fundamental factors in determining the availability of preferential 
treatment. The general focus on restoring what would otherwise constitute 
a loss to the plaintiff and an enrichment to the defendant, suggests that the 
value of the original enrichment should constitute the maximum amount 
of recovery. 
Admittedly this conclusion is questioned by the Tracing remedy. It 
provides some support for the availability of the profit preference even 
though there is no relationship between the plaintiff and subsequent 
recipient. To the extent that the beneficiary can identify the trust money 
he or she can recover it. Inherent in this remedy, therefore, is the ability to 
confer a profit preference. But is this an appropriate comparison? With the 
Tracing remedy, the principal object of the tracing process is to identify 
the trust property in the 'innocent' defendant's possession. It is only to the 
extent that it can be so identified that it is recoverable. The ability to profit 
arises as an offshoot of the tracing process and not as a deliberate policy 
10s Burrows, ibid, at 17. 
106 Supra, note 16. 
107 Ibid at 4 per Lord Templeman. 
10s While this preferential recovery was at the expense of the unsecured creditors, it was considered 
that they could not be in any better position than their debtor, the dishonest fiduciary. 
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decision. Indeed, it may only be in the rare situation in which there is 
evidence of direct substitution of trust money (and only trust money) for 
an appreciating asset that the possibility of the profit preference arises.lo9 
The analogy of the Tracing remedy can be hrther questioned because 
the remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy is limited by its restitution- 
ary nature. It is simply the restoration of the enrichment which justifies its 
preference. The rationale of the Tracing remedy, however, is the recovery 
of one's identified property. 
In some situations, however, principally restitution for wrongs, the value 
of restitutionary relief may bear no correlation to the defendant's loss. A 
question is whether in those situations the remedial restitutionary proprie- 
tary remedy should be available to recover any extra liability. It is submit- 
ted that it should not be so. Such a claim will arise when the defendant is 
insolvent and as is noted in Goff and Jones, "[tlo allow [the plaintiff] to 
capture the benefit gained ... ignore[s] the legitimate interests ofthe general 
creditors."l1° For this reason, except where there is a pre-existing relation- 
ship (for instance a fiduciary relationship), which the law wishes to protect, 
it seems sensible that the quantum of the insolvency procedure should be 
restricted to the value of the plaintiffs loss and no more. 
(ii) Knowledge 
These arguments challenge the suggestion contained within GofSand 
Jones that it is the recipient's knowledge of the circumstances which give 
rise to the restitutionary claim and justify the profit preference."' This is 
not to dispute that the defendant's knowledge is relevant. While the value 
of the original enrichment may constitute the upper limit of restitutionary 
relief, this value must constitute only the defendant's prima facie maxi- 
mum liability. This liability, of course, can be further reduced through the 
operation of defences such as the change of position defence. Subject to 
the overriding limitation that the loss to the plaintiffprovides the maximum 
level of recovery, it is submitted that it is only the actual value of the 
defendant's personal liability once these defences are taken into account 
which should be recoverable. If it is to have an effect, knowledge relates 
more to the "change of position" defence than to the claim itself. 
2. The insolvency preference 
The insolvency preference is so associated with the development of the 
remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy that preference automatically 
results. But to what extent should this be so? It follows from the earlier 
109 Support for this last observation is provided in Sinclair v Brougham supra, note 1 1 .  At 442-443 
Lord Parker distinguished the trustee and knowing recipient from the innocent recipient. While 
the innocent recipient of trust money may not be able to assert any priority against the beneficiary, 
upon restoration of the trust money there is no misconduct to preclude him or her from asserting 
ownership of the asset. In contrast, the trustee who mixes trust money in the acquisition of an asset 
has to recognise the right of the beneficiary to claim either a security interest or a proportionate 
ownership interest. If this argument is correct, it reinforces the submission that the potential 
availability of the profit preference in this situation is not the result of a positive judicial policy 
decision but arises as a consequence of the association of this remedy with tracing. In any event, 
should it be held that the plaintiff can receive the profit preference against an innocent recipient 
of trust money, there must be a strong case for the conferral of a generous allowance upon him or 
her for his or her investment services. 
I I O  Goffand Jones, op cit, note 4 at 734. 
111 Ibid at 95-98. 
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submission that the insolvency preference should culminate in a charge 
over the identified 'money' (or its substitute product) as opposed to an 
ownership interest. Furthermore the charge is for the value of the enrich- 
ment originally received by the recipient at the plaintiffs expense. If the 
insolvency preference is so restricted the real issue becomes what is the 
correct approach to tracing the money so as to determine the preference. 
In situations, such as the introductory example, where there is evidence 
of a direct substitution of the mistaken payer's money and only that money 
for another asset there should be no difficulty. This is the obvious situation 
for preferential recovery. The mistaken payer should be entitled to assert 
a charge over any after acquired asset for the value of the money deemed 
to have gone into it. Notwithstanding the earlier conclusion, some may 
argue that in this situation the mistaken payer should be able to assert 
'ownership' of the substitute asset. Support for this argument is provided 
by the approach to the recovery of trust money. Nevertheless it is submitted 
that the comparison is not appropriate. As already mentioned, in the trust 
situation the trustee has definitive duties to follow, i.e. the duties to invest 
and not to personally profit. It is to reinforce these duties that the trustee 
is presumed to have invested the money in the substitute asset on behalf 
of the trust. In the context of an insolvency, however, the remedial 
proprietary remedy is simply imposed to reinforce the plaintiffs personal 
remedy. For these reasons the value of the money mistakenly paid should 
be the upper limit for recovery. 
It is submitted that the situation in which there is no evidence as to what 
the recipient has done with the money (just that the money has been 
absorbed into his or her assets and it is pure conjecture as to whether the 
value of the money survives or has been dissipated), is equally as clear. 
The availability of preferential recovery is dependant upon a "protective 
presumed retention" approach. But this approach depends on a policy 
decision that there should be a guarantee of preferential recovery, irrespec- 
tive of whether that enrichment survives. So framed, the rejection of this 
approach is self-evident. After all, the protective presumed retention 
approach was specifically designed to protect the beneficiary against a 
breach of trust. Irrespective of whether the plaintiff accepted any risk of 
insolvency,l12 it is submitted that the availability of this protection should 
not be extended to this situation; to do so would be both to elevate the 
deemed equitable interest to that of a pre-existing interest and equate the 
policy rationale underlying the preferential recovery of an unjust enrich- 
ment (i.e. that the insolvent's creditors would otherwise be unjustly en- 
riched) to the same rationale as protecting the trust relationship. In any 
event the courts have retreated from this approach in determining the rights 
of benefi~iaries."~ 
Falling between these two extremes to tracing, there is the "presumed 
substitution" and the "surviving enrichment" approaches. When should 
112 Acceptance of risk is an argument which has been advanced to determine whether remedial 
restitutionary proprietary relief should in any given situation be potentially available. The principal 
advocate of this approach is Professor Paciocco, "The Remedial Constructive Trust: A Principled 
Basis for Priorities Over Creditors" (1989) 68 Can Bar Rev 315. See SR Scott, "The Remedial 
Constructive Trust in Commercial Transactions" [I9931 LMCLQ 330,341-349 for a modified 
version of this approach. 
I 1 3  See above at note 33. 
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these apply? Views will differ as to the appropriateness of the first. It will 
be recalled that this approach was developed in the context of determining 
withdrawals by the trustee from a mixed bank account and in some respects 
it can be seen as a forerunner of the "protective presumed retention" 
approach. The criticisms which apply to that approach must apply equally 
to the presumed substitution approach. Supporters of its application, how- 
ever, can point to the fact that the recipient is prima facie liable to repay 
the value of enrichment so received. It is only to the extent that he or she 
can identify what has subsequently happened that a change of position 
defence may be available. Since the onus of proof in this situation is on the 
recipient to show the dissipation of the money,l14 it may be argued that a 
similar onus should apply in respect to the remedial restitutionary proprie- 
tary remedy. Applying this argument to the situation of the deposit of the 
mistaken payment in a bank account, it would be presumed that the 
payment survives in that account or in any asset acquired with funds from 
that account. This would only be subject to the recipient (or his or her 
unsecured creditors) showing a destruction of that money or part thereof 
through the operation of the change of position defence. The imposition of 
a charge over the appropriate assets would facilitate the recovery of the 
original enrichment less any dissipation by the defendant. 
Turning to the surviving enrichment approach to tracing, it will be 
recalled that it is premised upon the fact that there is evidence that the 
defendant's total assets must have increased as a result of the receipt of the 
enrichment. Cases in which there is such evidence will be rare. When they 
do arise, however, it is submitted that to the extent of the surviving 
enrichment preferential recovery should be available. 
What about the situations in which the substitute asset depreciates in 
value? It is submitted that the depreciated value should constitute the upper 
level for preferential recovery. Why? There are two principal reasons. 
Firstly, preferential recovery is premised on identity, therefore logically 
the value of the identified asset or surviving enrichment should not be 
exceeded. The second argument relates to the change of position defence. 
As with the recovery of trust money, the mistaken plaintiff still has a 
personal claim against the defendant. This may be worthless in reality but 
it is still there. Unlike the claim in respect ofthe trustee, however, the claim 
against the defendant is subject to the change of position defence. In some 
situations, at least, the depreciation in the value of the substitute asset will 
be because of a change of position constituting a defence.'15 Where this is 
the situation it is submitted that preferential recovery should not exceed 
the value of the personal claim. 
What about the situation in which there is direct evidence that 'mixed' 
funds have been employed in the acquisition of a depreciating asset? 
Should the contribution of the defendant's own money preclude the avail- 
ability of preferential recovery for the recovery of the plaintiff s money? 
This does not seem fair. If the rationale for personal recovery and prefer- 
ential recovery, is the fact of the recipient's enrichment, this rationale is 
not destroyed just by the fact of the transformation of the enrichment into 
I 14 While the dissipation ofthe enrichment is aprerequisite to the availability ofthe change of position 
defence, dissipation per se does not justify its availability. See generally Lipkin Gorman supra, 
note 75 at 35. 
11s See Lord Templeman's example of the car in Lipkin Gorman ibid at 16. 
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a mixed form. The evidence of the application of the plaintiffs money 
should justify some (or proportionate) preferential recovery. Views will 
differ, as may be expected, to the extent of that preferential recovery. Just 
as in the recovery of trust money there are two possible solutions. One 
solution (and the solution applicable to the trustee) is to preclude the trustee 
from asserting any interest in the asset until the other money is restored. 
The other solution (and the solution applicable to the Tracing remedy) is 
to distribute the value of the depreciated asset in proportion to the respec- 
tive contributions. Since the defendant is under no positive duties of 
investment in respect of the enrichment it is submitted that the latter 
solution is preferable. It also meets the objection that there ought not be a 
windfall for the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant's unsecured 
creditors. 
3. The subsequent recipient preference 
What if the recipient gives the mistaken payment to another, should the 
mistaken payer have a right of recovery against the subsequent recipient? 
In this situation both the claim for money had and received and the Tracing 
remedy can be used to support such a remedy. In both situations it would 
seem that the innocent subsequent recipient of another's money can 
become subject to an obligation to restore it. One crucial difference 
between the remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy and these reme- 
dies, however, is that the latter remedies are protecting pre-existing pro- 
prietary interests. The immediate recipient knows or should know of that 
interest or at least the existence of such an interest. Until such time as the 
recipient of the mistaken payment becomes aware of the mistake, however, 
he or she will regard him or her self as the absolute owner of the money. 
In addition, in all usual circumstances the subsequent recipient should have 
no reason to question the ability of the transferor to transfer the money to 
him or her. Unless the remedial restitutionary remedy is to be used to 
guarantee recovery of the unjust enrichment there appears to be no reason 
for conferring a general right of recovery as against an innocent subsequent 
recipient. This is not to deny, however, that the subsequent recipient 
preference should never be available. 
There is a case for the availability of such a preference in certain 
situations, the strongest of which is when the subsequent recipient knows 
of the circumstances surrounding the mistaken payment. Whether it is 
appropriate in other situations is questionable. Admittedly the availability 
of the subsequent recipient preference in some but not all situations may 
appear to unduly complicate matters. The existence of the tracing and 
knowing receipt remedies, however, confirm that the circumstances sur- 
rounding the receipt by a subsequent recipient are important in determining 
his or her liability. They also demonstrate a recognition that a subsequent 
recipient's liability can depend on his or her degree of knowledge. 
Determining the nature and extent of preferential treatment which 
should be available pursuant to the remedial restitutionary proprietary 
remedy raises a number of difficult and contentious issues. Irrespective of 
agreement as to the specific conclusions reached, it is submitted that 
examinations such as undertaken in this article will be important, not only 
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for revealing the aims and concerns which have influenced the courts in 
the development of the existing rules for preferential treatment but also for 
revealing the aims and concerns which it is submitted will influence them 
with respect to the remedial restitutionary proprietary remedy. The over- 
riding influence, however, must be the underlying restitutionary rationale 
of this remedy. It is this influence which supports the application of the 
insolvency preference, subject to evidence of a surviving enrichment, but 
questions the availability of the profit preference. 
